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Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms from a Metaphysical 
Perspective 
Beate Krickel 
ABSTRACT  
According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic 
level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the 
mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel (2007) argue that a consequence of this 
view is that there cannot be causal interactions between acting entities at different 
mechanistic levels. Their main reason seems to be what I will call the Metaphysical 
Argument: things at different levels of a mechanism are related as part and whole; 
wholes and their parts cannot be related as cause and effect; hence, interlevel causation 
in mechanisms is impossible. I will analyze this argument in more detail and show 
under which conditions it is valid. This analysis will reveal that interlevel causation in 
mechanisms is indeed possible, if we take seriously the idea that the relata of the 
mechanistic level relation are acting entities and accept a slightly modified notion of a 
mechanistic level that is highly plausible in the light of the first clarification. 
1. Introduction 
The new mechanistic approach is not only fruitful with regard to methodological and 
epistemic issues in the philosophy of science (like, for example, scientific explanation 
and discovery). It also provides a good starting point for a fruitful metaphysics of the 
special sciences—a metaphysics that starts with a descriptively adequate analysis of the 
epistemology of the sciences, investigates the ontological commitments1 of it, and aims 
at building the fundament for a conceptually and metaphysically kosher philosophy of 
the special sciences. Some authors explicitly deal with metaphysical questions that are 
crucial to the mechanistic approach of scientific explanation. For example, Carl Craver 
defends the so-called ontic view of explanation according to which mechanisms exist 
mind-independently and are the truth-makers of mechanistic explanations (Craver 2007; 
Craver 2014); Phyllis Illari and Jon Williamson (2013) argue that a mechanistic 
ontology has to include entities and activities, where the latter are supposed to account 
for the causal aspects of mechanisms; Stuart Glennan (2010) argues that the 
metaphysics of causation should be understood in terms of mechanisms; and Carl Gillett 
                                                
1 Following Quine (1948), one might distinguish between metaphysics and ontology by assuming that 
ontology is about what there is (Which kinds of things do we have to assume?), whereas metaphysics 
addresses the features, relations etc. between these things (e.g. What is causation if we take it to be a 
relation between these things?). 
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(2013; 2010) argues against traditional accounts of realization on the basis of his 
analysis of the making-up relations in mechanisms.   
Analyzing the metaphysical implications of the new mechanistic approach is 
particularly interesting when they touch classical metaphysical problems like those 
discussed in the philosophy of mind literature. One metaphysical problem central to the 
philosophy of mind and the metaphysics of science in general is the question of whether 
there can be causal relations between entities at different levels. For example, one might 
hold that mental causation is a case of downward causation (Robb and Heil 2014). If 
one could make sense of downward causation in the mechanistic framework, this might 
provide a fruitful basis for thinking about mental causation. Answering traditional 
metaphysical philosophical questions like those concerning mental causation based on a 
metaphysical analysis of the new mechanistic approach is especially promising because 
it guarantees an answer that is rooted in an empirically justified approach. 
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the metaphysics of (apparent) 
interlevel causation in mechanisms. Contrary to Craver and Bechtel (2007), I will show 
that the new mechanistic approach is indeed compatible with a literal understanding of 
interlevel causal claims. After clarifying the metaphysical commitments of the new 
mechanistic approach with regard to the notion of levels of mechanisms, it will become 
clear that there is room for downward and upward causation between mechanistic 
levels. The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I will present the notion of a 
mechanism and that of a mechanistic level as introduced by Craver (2007). In Section 3, 
examples of apparent interlevel causation are introduced and the main objection against 
a literal understating of interlevel causal claims, which I will call the Metaphysical 
Argument, will be presented. In Section 4, I will provide a more detailed analysis of the 
Metaphysical Argument. I will argue that it is unclear what the relata of the part-whole 
relation are on which the Metaphysical Argument hinges. According to my analysis, the 
relata are best characterized as what I will call entity-involving occurrents (EIOs). In 
Section 5, I will show that on the basis of these insights, it is not only possible to 
illuminate the part-whole relation involved in mechanisms. We can also show that 
interlevel causation in mechanisms is possible if one accepts a slight but highly 
plausible modification of the definition of a mechanistic level. 
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2. Levels of Mechanisms  
The new mechanists argue that mechanisms come in hierarchies of levels of 
mechanisms. This is clearly a metaphysical notion, since according to Craver, levels of 
mechanisms are “features of the world rather than (...) features of the units or products 
of science“ (Craver 2007, 177). The relata at the different levels are taken to be 
behaving mechanisms (or “phenomena”) and their component entities and activities 
(Craver 2007, 189). Craver illustrates the notion of a mechanism, and that of a 
mechanistic level, with the help of what has come to be known as the Craver-diagram 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Mechanisms according to Craver (adapted from Craver (2007, 7)) 
In Figure 1, the behaving mechanism, which is also referred to as ‘phenomenon’ is at 
the higher level.2 The behaving mechanism/the phenomenon is represented by ‘S’s ψ-
ing,’ where ‘S’ refers to the mechanism as a whole, and ‘ψ’ represents the property or 
behavior of S that is to be explained. According to Craver, the phenomenon is explained 
by the organization of its component entities and activities that make up the mechanism 
at the lower level (Craver 2007, 7). In Figure 1, the Xs represent the entities that are 
components of the mechanism, and the ϕs are the activities performed by these entities. 
The arrows between the Xs’ ϕn-ings indicate that the components are causally 
interacting. The dotted lines indicate the hierarchy between the levels. But how do we 
have to understand this level-talk exactly? Let us first take a look at an example. One 
prominent example are the different levels of spatial memory (Craver 2007, 165–70). 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the different mechanistic levels of spatial memory. 
                                                
2 Note that there is some ambiguity in the mechanistic literature, whether the phenomenon just is the 
behaving mechanism, whether it is a behavior of the mechanism, or whether ‘S’ refers to a system that 
contains the mechanism (see Krickel (under review)). For the sake of argument, I will ignore this 
ambiguity here, and assume that the phenomenon is a behaving mechanism. 
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Figure 2 Example of different level of mechanisms (loosely adapted from (Craver 2007, 166)) 
As Figure 2 shows, at the top level of spatial memory is a mouse navigating the Morris 
Water Maze, which is supposed to be an instance of spatial memory behavior. One 
component of the mechanism that is responsible for the mouse’s navigation behavior is 
the hippocampus that generates spatial maps, which is therefore at a lower level that the 
Mouse navigating the Morris Water Maze. The hippocampus can generate spatial maps 
because it consists of neurons that induce long-term potentiation. Hence, the neurons 
producing long-term potentiation are at a lower level than the hippocampus generating 
spatial maps. Again, the long-term potentiation is enabled by NMDA-receptors, which 
are, thus, at a lower level than the neurons inducing long-term potentiation. More 
formally, Craver defines levels of mechanisms as follows: 
 
(Levels of Mechanisms) X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing if 
and only if X’s ϕ-ing is a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing. (Craver 2007, 
189) 
 
The relata X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are thereby taken to be “acting entities” (Craver 
2007, 189). An acting entity X’s ϕ-ing is a component of a mechanism for S’s ψ-ing, 
according to Craver’s mutual manipulability account, if the following holds: 
 
(Mechanistic Component) X’s ϕ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing 
if and only if: 
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i. X is part of S, and  
ii. X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are mutually manipulable. (Craver 2007, 153) 
 
Condition i. specifies that X has to be a spatiotemporal part of S: the entity-component 
(X) has to be a spatiotemporal part of the system whose behavior is to be explained. 
Condition (ii) is spelled out in terms of interventionism (Woodward, 2003, 2015): X’s 
ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are mutually manipulable if and only if it is possible to ideally 
intervene into X’s ϕ-ing and thereby change S’s ψ-ing, and it is possible to ideally 
intervene into S’s ψ-ing and thereby change X’s ϕ-ing. An intuitive understanding of 
interventions suffices for present purposes.3 Bottom-up manipulability of the 
phenomenon by intervening into a component of the mechanism alone is not sufficient 
to establish constitutive relevance. Craver introduces mutual manipulability in order to 
be able to distinguish between parts that are components and those that are mere 
background conditions, such as the heart’s beating which is a background condition of 
almost all mechanisms in living organisms. While it is possible to, for example, change 
word stem completion behavior by intervening into the heart’s beating, according to 
Craver, it is not possible to top-down manipulate the heart’s beating by intervening into 
word-stem completion behavior (Craver 2007, 158).4 
One can illustrate this formal characterization with help of the above example 
(Figure 2): The hippocampus generating spatial maps is at a lower level than the mouse 
navigating the Morris Water Maze because the former is a component of the mechanism 
for the latter. It is a component because the hippocampus is a part of the mouse 
(condition i. of Mechanistic Component), and the hippocampus’s activity and the 
mouse’s activity are mutually manipulable (condition ii. of Mechanistic Component; by 
changing the hippocampus’s activity you can change the mouse’s behavior, and vice 
versa). The same holds for the other lower mechanistic levels: each acting entity is a 
                                                
3 Many authors argue that the mutual manipulability account and interventionism are incompatible 
(Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and Baumgartner 2016; Romero 2015). 
Therefore, it remains controversial how to understand the claim that phenomena and mechanisms 
mutually depend on each other (note that promising attempts have been made to save the combination 
between constitutive explanation and interventionism; see (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and 
Baumgartner 2016; Krickel (forthcoming)). Here, I will ignore these problems for the sake of argument. 
Furthermore, as I will argue below, since interventionism is not a metaphysical account, it might be 
possible to accept the incompatibility of interventionism and mutual manipulability, while keeping the 
mutual manipulability criterion by providing a metaphysical analysis of manipulability (e.g., in 
counterfactual terms along Lewisian lines). 
4 However, Craver admits that further pragmatic considerations might be necessary to draw the line 
between background conditions and components (Craver 2007, 157). 
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part of the entity at the higher level, and the acting entities at the different levels are 
mutually manipulable. 
Based on this notion of a mechanistic level, Craver and Behctel (2007) have argued 
that causal interactions between levels are impossible. I will discuss their main 
argument for this deny of interlevel causation in mechanisms in the following section. 
3. Interlevel Causation & The Metaphysical Argument 
Craver and Bechtel (2007) discuss the case of a general who is killed by a heart attack 
as an example of (putative) bottom-up causation between mechanistic levels: 
If the general is viewed as a living human being (as opposed to an occupant of an 
office or rank in the military) whose behaviors are those of ordinary life 
(locomoting, communicating, etc.), then the heart is a component in one of her 
bodily mechanisms (e.g., the circulatory system). The failure of blood supply to 
the heart muscle is a failure of a part of the overall mechanism, and the ‘effect’ is 
on the whole mechanism – namely, death. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 557) 
The heart attack (the putative cause) is a component in at least some mechanisms 
responsible for the general’s living-behaviors (locomoting, communicating, etc.). 
Hence, the heart attack is at a lower level than the general’s living behaviors. Since the 
effect of the heart attack (death) concerns the disruption of these living-behaviors, this 
seems to be a case of bottom-up causation. An example of putative top-down causation 
in a mechanism is the following: 
Hal steps onto the court, serves, and so begins the tennis match. Very quickly, 
blood borne glucose is taken up through the cell membrane. Once inside, it is 
phosphorylated and bound into molecules of hexosediphosphate (…) Hal’s tennis 
playing also alters the behavior of innumerable biochemical pathways and cellular 
mechanisms that are involved in his tennis playing, both in the short-term and in 
the long-term. Why did Hal’s cells start using more glucose (i.e., binding glucose 
into molecules of hexosediphosphate)? Because Hal started to play tennis. Similar 
stories could be told about Hal’s respiratory mechanisms, visual system, and many 
others besides. Changing the behavior of the mechanism as a whole changed the 
activities of its components. (…) This is the sort of case for which appeal to top-
down causation seems most compelling. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 559) 
Here the apparent interlevel causal relation holds between a person playing tennis and 
her cells consuming glucose. The behavior of the cells is at a lower mechanistic level 
than the person playing tennis because the former is a component of the mechanism that 
is responsible for the person’s tennis playing. 
It has been argued by different authors that the notion of a mechanistic level does not 
allow for interlevel causation (Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Bechtel 2008; 
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Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and Baumgartner 2016; Romero 2015; 
Gebharter 2015). Hence, it is argued, the putative cases of bottom-up and top-down 
causation indeed cannot be given a strict causal reading. The heart attack is not a cause 
of the general’s death and the tennis playing is not a cause of the cells’ glucose 
consumption. One reason for this denial of interlevel causation in mechanisms stems 
from the fact that the interlevel relation (mutual manipulability) is spelled out in terms 
of interventionism. Michael Baumgartner and Alexander Gebharter (2015), and Felipe 
Romero (2015) argue that interventions into higher-level phenomena are necessarily fat-
handed in the sense that they necessarily change the higher-level phenomenon and at 
the same time one of the components of the mechanism at the lower level. Hence, these 
interventions are not ideal and thus cannot establish a causal relation between the two 
levels. If one takes the existence of ideal interventions to be a necessary condition for 
causation, it follows that there cannot be causal relations between levels.  
From a metaphysical perspective, one might doubt whether the non-existence of ideal 
interventions into higher-level phenomena proves that there cannot be causal relations 
between levels. Interventionism is not a metaphysical approach to causation and, thus, it 
might be that in fact there is interlevel causation but we are unable to establish it by 
means of interventions. Still, authors such as Craver and Bechtel (2007) have 
metaphysical reasons to deny interlevel causation in mechanisms as well. 5 The 
argument seems to be, roughly, that the concept of causation implies that causes and 
effects are wholly distinct, whereas the entities at different levels of mechanisms are 
related as part and whole (Bechtel 2008, 153–55; Craver 2007, 153–54, 195; Craver and 
Bechtel 2007, 551–55). Hence, they cannot be causes or effects of one another. More 
concretely, the following Metaphysical Argument seems to be what underlies Craver’s 
and Bechtel’s line of argument: 
 
(The Metaphysical Argument) 
                                                
5 A further metaphysical reason to deny interlevel causation in mechanisms that is independent of the 
interventionist approach is the causal exclusion argument (Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Kim 2005). I 
will not address this objection here because, first, the objection discussed in this paper is more 
fundamental than objections based on exclusion worries. The present objection, roughly, is that the level-
relata do not even qualify as possible candidates for causal interactions. The exclusion argument starts 
with the assumption that things at different levels, prima facie, are candidates for being causes and 
effects. Hence, if it turned out that the objection discussed in this paper goes through, there is no need to 
talk about exclusion worries at all because mechanistic interlevel causation turns out to be impossible for 
more basic reasons. Of course, if it turns out that the objections discussed here can be rejected, one has to 
meet the challenge posed by the exclusion argument. To see how this could be done in the context of 
mechanistic levels see Krickel (under review). 
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1. X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing iff X’s ϕ-ing is a 
component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing. [def.] 
2. Interlevel causation is a causal relation between things at different levels. 
[def.] 
3. Mechanistic interlevel causation is possible iff there can be causal 
interactions between a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing and S’s ψ-
ing. [from 1, 2] 
4. X’s ϕ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing iff X is part of S, 
and X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are mutually manipulable. [def.] 
5. If X’s ϕ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing, then X’s ϕ-ing 
and S’s ψ-ing are related as part and whole. [from 4] 
6. Mechanistic interlevel causation is possible only if there can be causal 
interactions between a whole and its parts. [from 3, 5] 
7. Cause and effect are wholly distinct, their occurrence is temporally 
asymmetric, and effects depend6 on causes, but not vice versa.7 [def.] 
8. Wholes and their parts are spatiotemporally coexisting or at least overlapping, 
changes in them occur simultaneously, and they are mutually dependent. 
[def.] 
9. Things that are related as part and whole cannot be related as cause and 
effect, and vice versa. [from 7, 8] 
10. Mechanistic interlevel causation is not possible. [from 6, 9] 
 
Premise 1 is a statement of Craver’s definition of levels of mechanisms (see Section 2). 
Premise 2 is a rather trivial fact about interlevel causation. Statement 3 follows from 1 
and 2: mechanistic interlevel causation is possible if and only if there can be causal 
interactions between a component of a mechanism and the phenomenon that is brought 
about by that mechanism. According to the definition of what it is to be a mechanistic 
                                                
6 It is not entirely clear how Craver and Bechtel understand the difference in dependency between causes 
and effect, on the one hand, and wholes and their parts, on the other. This is what they write: „It is a 
widely accepted condition on accounts of causation that they account for the asymmetry of causal 
dependency. The sun’s elevation causes the length of the shadow, but the length of the shadow does not 
determine the elevation of the sun. The virus produces the spots on the skin, but the spots on the skin do 
not cause the infection with the virus. […] While at least some cases of intralevel causation are 
asymmetrical, all of the interesting cases of interlevel causation are symmetrical: components act as they 
do because of factors acting on mechanisms, and mechanisms act as they do because of the activities of 
their lower-level components.“ (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 553) 
7 One might contest that causation and the part-whole relation indeed have the features assumed in 
premises 7 and 8. For the sake of argument I will accept the truth of these premises. I take these 
statements to be summaries of Craver’s and Bechtel’s considerations. 
- FINAL DRAFT - 
 9 
component introduced in Section 2 (premise 4), the components of a mechanism and the 
phenomenon that is brought about by that mechanism are related as part and whole 
(statement 5). Hence, in order for there to be mechanistic interlevel causation, it must be 
possible that wholes and their parts can causally interact (statement 6). But, as stated in 
9, it is commonly accepted that causes and effects, on the one hand, and wholes and 
their parts, on the other, have characteristics that renders causal interactions between 
wholes and their parts impossible (premises 7 and 8). Hence, it follows that interlevel 
causation between things at different levels of mechanisms is impossible (10). 
Denying the truth of claims such as ‘The heart attack is the cause of the general’s 
death’ or ‘Hal’s playing tennis causes his cells to consume more glucose’ seems to be 
odd. Claims like these do not only reflect our everyday talk about causal relations but 
also scientific causal claims. Craver and Bechtel admit this: 
Many philosophers (e.g., Alexander 1927; and several authors in Andersen et al. 
2000) and scientists (e.g., Morgan 1927; Campbell 1974; Sperry 1976) appeal to 
top-down causes in their explanations. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 547) 
 
In order to, on the one hand, account for the fact that philosophers and scientists are not 
speaking falsely every time they make interlevel causal claims, while on the other hand, 
account for the impossibility of interlevel causation in mechanisms, Craver and Bechtel 
develop an account of what they call mechanistically mediated effects (Craver and 
Bechtel 2007). According to this account, causation occurs only intralevel. The 
interlevel relation is taken to be a non-causal constitutive relation. In order to see how 
this account reduces interlevel causation to mechanistically mediated effects, consider 
the case of apparent top-down causation. According to Craver and Bechtel, top-down 
causation indeed consists of a constitution relation between the apparent higher-level 
cause and a lower-level mechanism, and a causal relation between the lower-level 
mechanism and the lower-level effect. The effect of the apparent higher-level cause, 
indeed, is an effect of the lower-level mechanism that constitutes it. Hence, according to 
this analysis, literally speaking, interlevel causal claims are false. 
I will show that the mechanistic approach indeed provides resources to account for 
the literal truth of interlevel causal claims such as ‘The heart attack is the cause of the 
general’s death’ or ‘Hal’s playing tennis causes his cells to consume more glucose’ 
without “evok[ing] concerns that the notion of top-down causation is incoherent or that 
it involves spooky forces exerted by wholes upon their components” (Craver and 
Bechtel 2007, 548). A literal interpretation of interlevel causal claims is more 
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straightforward than the interpretation based on mechanistically mediated effects since 
it has to postulate only one relation (causation between behaving mechanisms/ 
phenomena and their components) instead of two (causation between components of 
mechanisms, and constitution between mechanistic components and behaving 
mechanisms/phenomena) in order to account for the truth of interlevel causal claims. 
Furthermore, as I will show, the metaphysical tools one needs to make sense of 
interlevel claims in a literal way is already inherent to the new mechanistic approach. 
No additional metaphysical claims are necessary that the new mechanists do not already 
accept, or are committed to—all one has to do is to lay bare the metaphysical 
commitments of the new mechanists’ claims regarding levels of mechanisms and their 
relata (acting entities). 
In the following section I will first show that the Metaphysical Argument as it is 
presented above is not valid. However, there is an easy fix, which becomes obvious if 
one takes a closer look at the metaphysics of the relata of the mechanistic interlevel 
relation. Still, the analysis of the Metaphysical Argument will show that there is a way 
to make sense of interlevel causation in mechanisms. 
4. Clarifying the Metaphysical Argument: the Part-Whole Relation and its 
Relata 
Statement 5 of the Metaphysical Argument states that if X’s ϕ-ing is a component of the 
mechanism for S’s ψ-ing, then X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are related as part and whole. 
This is supposed to follow directly from Craver’s definition of mechanistic componency 
(premise 4). But does it follow? How do we have to understand the first condition of 
Craver’s definition of mechanistic componency (“X is part of S”)? Leuridan (Leuridan 
2012) suggests the following definition of the part-whole relation that Craver might 
have in mind when defining the first condition for mechanistic componency:  
 
(STI) X is part of S iff the spatio-temporal region occupied by X is contained in 
the spatio-temporal region occupied by S. (Leuridan 2012) 
 
Does (STI) validate the inference from Craver’s definition of mechanistic componency 
to statement 5? After all, (STI) speaks of part-whole relations that obtain between X and 
S, which stand for entities (material objects). Given this, it is not immediately clear 
whether the definition also applies to things such as X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing (i.e. acting 
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entities) that statement 5 talks about. Hence, if we interpret the first condition of 
Craver’s definition of mechanistic componency in terms of (STI) it is at best unclear 
whether statement 5 follows or not because it does not talk about acting entities.  
One might argue that the part-whole relation between the entities X and S is 
sufficient to prohibit causal relations between X and S, and this is sufficient to show that 
mechanistic interlevel causation is impossible. One problem with this idea is that causal 
interactions between X and S are precluded for trivial reasons: X and S are simply not 
the kind of things that can be related by causation. In the literature on the metaphysics 
of causation, it is a common assumption that causation is a relation between events—not 
entities (objects). Thus, the relevant question is whether there can be causal interactions 
between an event in which X is involved (an “X-event”) and one in which S is involved 
(an “S-event”) given that X is a part of S in the sense of (STI). According to Lewis (D. 
K. Lewis 1973; D. K. Lewis 1986; D. K. Lewis 2000), events must be wholly distinct in 
order to be causally related (see premise 7 of the Metaphysical Argument). “Wholly 
distinct,” roughly, means that the two events occupy different space-time regions. Can 
X-events and S-events be wholly distinct given that X is a spatial material part of S? 
Yes, they can: Although X and S are related as part and whole, X- and S-events might 
occur in different space-time regions. Consider, for example, my going for a walk this 
morning and my stomach’s digesting this afternoon. My stomach is a spatial part of me. 
Still, my walk and my stomach’s digesting are wholly distinct events: My walk this 
morning occupied a particular route through the park from 9 to 10 a.m.; my stomach’s 
digesting occupied a space-time region inside me while I was sitting on my couch from 
2 to 3 p.m. Hence, my walk and my stomach’s digesting occur at different space-time 
regions. Thus, (STI) alone cannot justify the rejection of mechanistic interlevel 
causation.8 
Is there another way to spell out the part-whole relation? As already mentioned 
above, Craver points out that the relata of the mechanistic level relation are not mere 
material objects/entities. Nor are the relata activities (Craver 2007, 189). Rather, Craver 
argues, the mechanistic level relation is a relation between “acting entities” (ibid.). 
Plausibly, Craver takes X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing to stand for acting entities. So maybe 
the part-whole relation between acting entities (in contrast to the part-whole relation 
between entities only) prohibits interlevel causation in mechanisms. But what are acting 
entities and in which sense can they be related as part and whole? 
                                                
8 Note, that when introdcuing (STI) it is not Leuridan’s aim to reject interlevel causation in mechanisms. 
Rather, he seems to embrace this idea. 
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Most plausibly acting entities are events. Unfortunately there are different 
conceptions of what exactly events are (for an overview see (Casati and Varzi 2015)). In 
order to avoid confusions, I will not use the term ‘event’ as an analysis of what acting 
entities are. Rather, I will use the term entity-involving occurrent (EIO) (see also 
BLINDED). This notion is supposed to make explicit that for the individuation of a 
particular EIO an entity is crucial (the term ‘event’ is ambiguous in this respect). 
Furthermore, talking about occurrents in the present context accounts for the idea that 
“activities exist only extended in time” (Illari and Williamson 2013, 72), while avoiding 
the problems afflicting the notion of an activity. First, the distinction between occurrents 
and continuants is common in metaphysics (Simons and Melia 2000). While continuants 
(such as entities/objects) are said to exist in time, occurrents (such as processes) are 
taken to exist through time. Second, by introducing the notion of an occurrent one is not 
committed to the highly controversial and unclear assumption that the components of 
mechanisms are active or productive (Psillos 2004). Occurrents need not be active or 
productive. Furthermore, the notion of an EIO is supposed to make explicit that, on the 
one hand, in mechanisms entities are necessarily engaged in a certain behavior, and on 
the other hand, behaviors cannot occur without an entity that behaves. This is what 
inspired so-called “entity activity dualism” which is defended by many new mechanists 
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). Talking merely about “entities and activities” 
does not express this kind of dependency between entities and activities. Finally, 
describing the relata of the part-whole relation as EIOs has the consequence that causal 
relations between wholes and parts are not precluded for trivial reasons. EIOs are 
plausible candidates for being causal relata (if one agrees that events can be causes and 
effects, one should be willing to accept that EIOs are, too).  
Now, let us come back to the question of which part-whole relations we need in order 
to get the Metaphysical Argument to go through. EIOs can be regarded as space-time 
worms. With this picture in mind, we can see that EIOs have parts in two different 
senses: first, EIOs have, what I will call, spatial EIO-parts (cut the space-time worm 
parallel to the time axis; see Figure 3 a)). Second, EIOs have temporal EIO-parts (cut 
the space-time worm orthogonal to the time axis; see Figure 3 b)). Spatial as well as 
temporal EIO-parts of EIOs are again EIOs (therefore I speak of “EIO-parts”).  
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Figure 3 Illustration of a) a spatial EIO-part of an EIO, and b) a temporal EIO-part of an EIO. 
Somewhat more formally, the two kinds of part-whole relations between EIOs can be 
defined as follows: 
(spatial EIO-part) EIO1 is a spatial EIO-part of EIO2 iff: 
(i) the entity involved in EIO1 occupies a proper spatiotemporal sub-region of 
the region occupied by the entity involved in EIO2, 
(ii) the occurrent involved in EIO1 takes place during the occurrence of EIO2. 
Note that condition (i) of (spatial EIO-part) just is the right-hand side of (STI) (see 
above). Temporal EIO-parts of an EIO are defined as follows: 
(temporal EIO-part) EIO1 is a temporal EIO-part of EIO2 iff: 
(i) the entity involved in EIO1 is identical with the entity involved in EIO2, 
(ii) EIO1 begins later and ends earlier than EIO2, or EIO1 begins simultaneously 
with EIO2 and ends earlier than EIO2, or EIO1 begins later than EIO2 and ends 
simultaneously with EIO2. 
Consider the following example: Suppose I go for a walk and, at the same time, my 
stomach is digesting. In this case, the stomach’s digesting is a spatial EIO-part of me 
going for a walk. In contrast to that, my turning right to enter the park is a temporal 
EIO-part of my walk. It is important to note the following: the notion of a temporal 
EIO-part does not presuppose or imply some kind of 4-dimensionalism with regard to 
objects. I do not argue that my walk through the park involves only a temporal part of 
me. I am still a three-dimensional object that is wholly present at any time point during 
my walk. Indeed, I am not concerned with temporal parts of objects here at all. 
Temporal EIO-parts are parts of EIOs, not of objects. In fact, temporal EIO-parts 
consist of three-dimensional objects (that behave in a certain way). 
Now, let us apply these insights about EIOs to the notion of a mechanism. The 
phenomenon S’s ψ-ing is an EIO. The mechanism itself is a collection of organized 
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EIOs (the Xs’ ϕ-ings) that are spatial EIO-parts of the phenomenon-EIO (where being a 
spatial EIO-part is necessary but not sufficient for being a component of a mechanism; 
the EIOs and the phenomenon also have to be mutually manipulable (see Section 2)). 
On the basis of the EIO-interpretation of the relata of the part-whole relation, a 
mechanism can be illustrated as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Mechanisms according to the view that the relata of the part-whole relation are EIOs 
Here, similar to Craver’s illustration (see Figure 1) ‘S’s ψ-ing’ (labeling the big tube) 
stands for the phenomenon, for example, the dying general, or a person playing tennis. 
The different Xs’ ϕ-ings represent the components (the smaller grey tubes), for 
example, the heart’s malfunctioning, or cells consuming glucose. As before, the arrows 
between the components symbolize causal interactions between them. The organized 
collection of the components makes up the mechanism. The major difference between 
Figure 4 and Craver’s illustration is that Figure 4 clarifies the temporal and spatial 
dimensions within a mechanism. The left-right direction is interpreted as the temporal 
direction, whereas the other two dimensions are spatial dimensions. 
On the basis of the EIO-interpretation we can show that the Metaphysical Argument 
is valid. The insight that components of mechanisms are spatial EIO-parts of 
phenomenon-EIOs renders the step from premise 4 to statement 5 valid. Premise 4 has 
to be modified as follows: 
4.* X’s ϕ-ing is a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing iff X’s ϕ-ing is a 
spatial EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing, and X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are mutually 
manipulable. [def.] 
If we replace premise 4 with premise 4*, statement 5 follows: if X’s ϕ-ing is a 
component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing, then X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are related as 
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part and whole. Illuminating the nature of X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing in terms of the EIO-
interpretation makes clear why there cannot be causal relations between X’s ϕ-ing and 
S’s ψ-ing. The reason is that, if X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are EIOs and X’s ϕ-ing is a 
spatial EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing, then X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing occur in the same space-time 
region. The notion of causation requires causes and effects to occur in different space-
time regions. Hence, there cannot be causal relations between X’s ϕ-ing and S’s ψ-ing. 
Note that the same applies to temporal EIO-parts: if an EIO is a temporal EIO-part of 
another EIO, there cannot be a causal relation between them. Again, the reason is that 
one EIO occupies a spatiotemporal sub-region of the region where the other EIO occurs.  
I am not claiming that this is not what Craver and Bechtel actually have in mind. 
Rather, my claim is that this is in line with and illuminates their ideas. It is plausible that 
Craver and Bechtel take acting entities to be extended in space and time in the sense I 
explicated above, and that they take the part-whole relation to be a relation between 
acting entities, rather than just entities. 
Based on the EIO-interpretation we can show much more. First, one can show that 
Craver’s and Bechtel’s examples indeed differ in a crucial respect: some involve a 
spatial while others involve a temporal EIO-part-whole relation. Consider the following 
example: 
The change in the conformation of rhodopsin is a stage in the signal transduction 
pathway. Although the change in rhodopsin is a cause of the electrical signal 
generated by the cell, scientists do not regard it as a cause of signal transduction. 
(Craver and Bechtel 2007, 552) 
In this example, the part (the change in the conformation of rhodopsin) is an EIO that is 
a temporal EIO-part of the phenomenon-EIO (signal transduction). Craver and Bechtel 
correctly diagnose, that there cannot be a causal relation between the conformation 
change of the rhodopsin and signal transduction. In contrast to that, the heart-attack 
example involves a spatial part-whole relation between EIOs. As already mentioned 
above, Craver and Bechtel argue that the heart attack cannot be considered a cause of 
the general’s death, because the failure of the heart is a part of the “overall mechanism, 
and the ‘effect’ is on the whole mechanism”. Indeed, this example can be interpreted in 
two ways, where only one interpretation does not allow for interlevel causation. 
According to the first interpretation, the part-whole relation involved in this example is 
a spatial EIO-part-whole relation that holds between the heart’s failure and the EIO that 
is the general’s dying, and we assume that the general’s dying begins right when the 
heart begins to malfunction. In this case, the heart’s failure and the general’s dying 
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occur in the same space-time region. Hence, there cannot be a causal relation between 
the two events. According to a second interpretation of this example, interlevel 
causation is not prohibited. This is the case if we take the death of the general to be a 
(the final) temporal EIO-part of the phenomenon (the dying). In the next section, I will 
provide a general analysis of how interlevel causation in a mechanism is possible that 
captures this interpretation of the heart attack example.  
5. Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms 
Although Craver and Bechtel are right in that there cannot be causal interactions 
between a phenomenon-EIO and its spatial and temporal EIO-parts, there might still be 
a way to make sense of interlevel causation in mechanisms. To see that, recall Craver’s 
definition of the mechanistic level relation: 
 
(Levels of Mechanisms) X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing if 
and only if X’s ϕ-ing is a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing. (Craver 
2007, 189) 
 
According to the EIO-interpretation of mechanisms, components of mechanisms are 
EIOs that are spatial EIO-parts of the phenomenon-EIO (where the spatial EIO-part and 
the phenomenon are mutually manipulable). Furthermore, in the previous section I have 
argued that EIOs have temporal EIO-parts. Every phenomenon-EIO S’s ψ-ing can be 
divided into different temporal EIO-parts. The crucial point is that it is plausible to 
assume that if X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing, then X’s ϕ-ing is 
also at a lower mechanistic level than every temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing.  
 
(Levels of Mechanism*) X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing 
and every temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing if and only if X’s ϕ-ing is a component 
of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing.  
Consider the example provided in Section 2. In this example, the hippocampus’s 
generating spatial maps is at a lower mechanistic level than the mouse’s navigating the 
Morris Water Maze. The mouse’s behavior can be divided into different temporal EIO-
parts: first, the mouse is put into the pool (the maze), then the mouse starts swimming, it 
turns left, then it turns right, and so on, until it finds the platform hidden under the water 
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surface. It is plausible to hold that the hippocampus generating spatial maps is at a lower 
mechanistic level than all of these temporal EIO-parts. 
Why should we accept the modified notion of a mechanistic level? One reason is that 
denying the modification seems to lead to a contradiction between two claims. On the 
one hand, it is highly plausible to assume that S’s ψ-ing just is the sum of its temporal 
parts in a particular temporal order (the mouse’s navigation behavior is identical to the 
mouse’s turning left, turning right, and so on, until it finds the platform). Hence, if a 
component X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing, and S’s ψ-ing = S’s 
ψ-ing’s organized temporal parts, one seems to be committed to accepting that X’s ϕ-
ing is at a lower mechanistic level than the temporal parts of S’s ψ-ing. On the other 
hand, by denying the modification, one would deny that X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower 
mechanistic level than the temporal parts of S’s ψ-ing.   
A further reason for accepting the modified notion of a mechanistic level is the 
following: one feature of the notion of a mechanistic level is that it is local—it does not 
take levels to organize nature or science as a whole but rather only within a mechanism 
(Craver 2007, 192). Critics have argued that this is a bug rather than a feature (Eronen 
2015). Independently of the objections that have been raised against the locality of 
mechanistic levels in the literature, denying the suggested modification would render 
the locality of mechanistic levels even stronger and (more) implausible: things would be 
at different mechanistic levels only if they occurred at exact the same time. To see that: 
a contester of the modified definition would argue that the original idea motivating the 
notion of levels of mechanisms was that we get levels from part-whole relations: X’s ϕ-
ing is at a lower level than S’s ψ-ing only if the former is a spatial-EIO part of S’s ψ-
ing. My modification would deny this: an X’s ϕ-ing need not be a spatial-EIO part of 
any temporal EIO-parts of S’s ψ-ing, and still it would be at a lower level than any 
temporal EIO-part. Now, a contester of the modification could insist that X’s ϕ-ing has 
to be a spatial-EIO part of the temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing in order to be at a lower 
level than this temporal EIO-part. This contester would be committed to the claim that 
any X’s ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level only relative to phenomena that occur at 
the very same time. Hence, mechanistic levels would turn out to have a vertical 
dimension only. 
This is an unwanted consequence for several reasons: first, the notion of a 
mechanistic level was supposed to capture the idea that phenomena are at higher-levels 
relative to all of the components of their mechanisms. The components of the 
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mechanisms are taken to be temporally organized in such a way that they give rise to the 
phenomenon. This usually includes that the components of a mechanisms are active 
only at specific stages of the phenomenon’s occurrence. In these cases, it would be 
strictly speaking false to say that these components are at a lower level than the whole 
phenomenon. Second, given that the relata of the mechanistic level-relation are acting 
entities that usually operate at different time scales, it is questionable whether temporal 
synchrony gives rise to an intelligible individuation of the relata. It might turn out that, 
for example, it is not the long-term potentiation that is at a lower-level than the 
hippocampus’s generating spatial maps but only the second temporal half of it. This 
would render the notion of a mechanistic level useless with regard to the original aim of 
making sense of claims such as ‘The cell’s behavior is at a lower level than the 
organism’s behavior.’ Third, if the notion of a scientific level is to make any sense, it 
has to account for the horizontal dimension as well, i.e. for the idea that things can be at 
the same level. The original definition of a mechanistic level cannot provide this. Craver 
admits that “there can be no unique answer to the question of when two items are at the 
same level“ (Craver 2007, 192). Based on the EIO-interpretation we can make sense of 
the same-level relation: two EIOs are at the same mechanistic level iff one is a temporal 
EIO-part of the other, or they are temporal EIO-parts of the same EIO. 
Note that even if (Levels of Mechanism*) gives up on a strict reading of the parthood 
condition it still accounts for the idea that a spatial EIO-part (X’s ϕ-ing) and the 
phenomenon (S’s ψ-ing) need to be mutually manipulable in order for the former to be 
at a lower mechanistic level than the latter: for every X’s ϕ-ing there has to be a top-
down intervention on (a temporal EIO-part) of S’s ψ-ing that changes X’s ϕ-ing, and 
there has to be a bottom-up intervention on X’s ϕ-ing that changes (a temporal EIO-part 
of) S’s ψ-ing. Being a component in a mechanism for a particular S’s ψ-ing does not 
require the component to be top-down manipulable with respect to every temporal EIO-
part of S’s ψ-ing; neither does it require every temporal EIO-part to be manipulable 
through X’s ϕ-ing. For an X’s ϕ-ing to be a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing 
it suffices that there is at least one temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing that can be changed 
by changing X’s ϕ-ing, and that there is at least one temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing that 
induces changes in X’s ϕ-ing. If one denies that S’s ψ-ing can be changed by changing a 
temporal EIO-part of it (although denying this seems to me to be rather implausible), 
the two conditions I present can be regarded as a suggestion of how to make sense of 
mutual manipulability: mutual manipulability does not hold between a phenomenon as a 
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whole and a component but rather between temporal EIO-parts of the phenomenon and 
the component. 
Now, how does this modified notion of a mechanistic level render interlevel 
causation possible? Interlevel causation becomes possible because some spatial EIO-
parts (components of the mechanism) of the phenomenon and some of its proper 
temporal EIO-parts are not themselves related as parts and wholes. Still, according to 
the modified notion of a mechanistic level, they are at different levels. To get the idea, 
consider the Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 Possible interlevel causal interactions in mechanisms. The Xis’ ϕi-ings are at lower mechanistic levels than 
S’s ψ-ing and the temporal EIO-parts S’s ψj-ings.   
In Figure 5, bottom-up as well as top-down causation is illustrated. The bottom-up 
direction consists in an interlevel causal relation between X1’s ϕ1-ing and S’s ψ1-ing. On 
the assumption that X1’s ϕ-ing is a component of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing, and our 
modified definition of a level of mechanism, X1’s ϕ1-ing is at a lower mechanistic level 
than S’s ψ1-ing since S’s ψ1-ing is a temporal EIO-part of S’s ψ-ing. Interlevel causation 
is possible in this case because X1’s ϕ1-ing and S’s ψ1-ing are not related as part and 
whole. Top-down causation, in Figure 5, is illustrated as a relation between S’s ψ2-ing 
and X4’s ϕ4-ing. Similar to the bottom-up direction, in this case S’s ψ2-ing and X4’s ϕ4-
ing are at different levels. Still, a causal relation between them is possible because they 
are not related as part and whole. Hence, if we take mechanistic interlevel causation to 
consist in causal interactions between the components of the mechanism and temporal 
EIO-parts of the phenomenon, we can make sense of interlevel causation in 
mechanisms.  
Note that I do not want to claim that scientists are usually interested in explaining the 
temporal EIO-parts of a phenomenon. In constitutive mechanistic explanations the 
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explanandum is a certain phenomenon as a whole—not only temporal EIO-parts of it. 
Although this might sometimes be the case (for example, when explaining the 
propagation of an action potential, scientists are interested in how the different phases 
(i.e. temporal EIO-parts) of depolarization, hyperpolarization, etc. are brought about), 
this is not what I am arguing for. Rather, my goal in this paper was to provide a 
metaphysical analysis of the notion of interlevel causation in the context of the new 
mechanistic approach. Furthermore, my goal is to show that sentences like “her heart 
attack caused her death” can be literally true. If we take the death to be a temporal EIO-
part of the process of dying (plausibly it is the last temporal EIO-part), the heart attack 
can be a cause of the death in a literal sense even if the death occurs on a higher 
mechanistic level than the heart attack. 
6. Conclusion 
Craver and Bechtel’s objection against interlevel causation, summarized in what I called 
the Metaphysical Argument, is valid (i) if one takes the relata to be EIOs (events), and 
(ii) if one takes lower-level EIO to be spatial EIO-parts of higher-level EIOs. Still, the 
mechanistic picture leaves room for interlevel causation if one accepts a slight and 
highly plausible modification of the notion of a mechanistic level: a component of a 
mechanism is at a lower mechanistic level than the phenomenon and all of its temporal 
EIO-parts. If we take mechanistic interlevel causation to hold between components of 
mechanisms and temporal EIO-parts of the phenomenon, interlevel causation in 
mechanisms becomes possible. This view of mechanistic interlevel causation has 
several advantages: first, we can account for the literal truth of causal statements such as 
“the heart attack caused her death”; second it makes sense of the idea that levels of 
nature have a horizontal dimension, and thus it can make sense of the idea that things 
can be at the same level of mechanism (if one is a temporal part of the other, or if they 
are temporal parts of the same EIO); third, it might provide resources for a new 
approach to mental causation. Spelling out the latter must be the topic of another paper. 
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